

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 244185

46

ORIGIN SS-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /011 R

66605

DRAFTED BY: EUR:JDROUSE

APPROVED BY: EUR:JAARMITAGE

C:MR. BLACKWELL

S/S:MR. MOFFAT

----- 038330

R 060357Z NOV 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

S E C R E T STATE 244185

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS MOSCOW

USDEL ALT TWO GENEVA NEW DELHI DACCA FROM NATO 29 OCTOBER 1974

QUOTE S E C R E T USNATO 6021

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO UR, PARM

SUBJ: SECRETARY KISSINGER'S MOSCOW VISIT: REPORT TO NAC, OCT

29

NEW DELHI AND DACCA FOR THE SECRETARY

LONDON FOR SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 244185

BEGIN SUMMARY: COUNSELOR SONNENFELDT AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY

HARTMAN CONSULTED WITH THE ALLIES IN RESTRICTED NAC SESSION, OCT 29, ABOUT SECRETARY KISSINGER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET LEADERS IN MOSCOW OCT 23 - 27. THE DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW COVERED A RANGE OF SUBJECTS, INCLUDING CSCE, MIDDLE EAST AND US-SOVIET BILATERAL MATTERS. THE MAIN FOCUS OF THE TALKS, HOWEVER, DEALT WITH LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. NO DISCUSSIONS OF MBFR TOOK PLACE.

SOVIETS BEGAN DISCUSSIONS BY RECITING A NUMBER OF GRIEVANCES TOWARD THE US. THEY COMPLAINED ABOUT PUBLIC MANNER IN WHICH THE SOVIET EMIGRATION ISSUE HAD BEEN HANDLED IN THE US AND FACT THAT THEY HAD NOT YET RECEIVED MFN TREATMENT. THEY RAISED WAY IN WHICH THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATION WAS BEING HANDLED UNILATERALLY BY THE US AND REITERATED THEIR POSITION FAVORING RESUMPTION OF GENEVA TALKS. A SERIES OF LESS SIGNIFICANT ISSUES WERE RAISED SUCH AS US EXPORT LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASES AND THE SLOW PACE OF CSCE NEGOTIATIONS. ON LATTER MATTER, SOVIETS COMPLAINED US WAS NOT TAKING SUFFICIENTLY ACTIVE ROLE.

US REPS EXPLAINED THAT THE US VIEWED MOSCOW MEETING PRIMARILY AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS ON OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS AND FOR PROBING SIGNS OF FRESH SOVIET THOUGHT OR NEW FLEXIBILITY. A GOOD MANY HOURS OF MOSCOW DISCUSSION DEVOTED TO SALT MATTERS. DDESPITE THE POSITION SOVIETS ARE TAKING AT GENEVA, THERE WAS ONLY PERFUNCTORY REFERENCE IN THE MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS TO THE "FBS" ISSUE. US REPS HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE MOVING TOWARD THE CONCEPT OF EQUAL AGGREGATES ON CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. IF SO, THIS WOULD BE A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH. THEY FELT THAT DISCUSSION WITH SOVIETS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS COULD EITHER CONFIRM OR DENY THEIR IMPRESSION. SOVIETS LEFT IMPRESSION THEY ARE MOVING IN DIRECTION OF EQUAL NUMBERS OF MIRV LAUNCHERS, BUT WITH NO SUBLIMITS OR BAN ON HEAVY ICBMS (I.E., SS-18). ALTHOUGH NOT RAISING THE FBS ISSUE, THE SOVIETS DID PLACE EMPHASIS ON THE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES OF THIRD COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE CHINESE (BUT NOT MENTIONING INDIA). THE SOVIETS VIEW THESE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS AS HOSTILE TO THEM AND FOR THAT REASON FEEL ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION. THE SOVIET EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE B-1 AND ITS AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE ARMAMENT AND LEFT IMPRESSION THAT ASM'S

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 244185

WOULD BE SUBJECT TO FOLLOW-ON DISCUSSIONS.

ON CSCE, SOVIETS COMPLAINED THAT THE US WAS NOT TAKING SUFFICIENTLY ACTIVE ROLE, EXPRESSED THEIR IMPATIENCE WITH SLOW PACE OF CONFERENCE AND REAFFIRMED DESIRE FOR EARLY CONCLUSION. DURING ONE-HOUR MOSCOW SESSION DEVOTED TO CSCE DISCUSSION, US MADE POINT THAT IT BELIEVED REMAINING BASKET I ISSUES WERE SUFFICIENTLY DEVELOPED SO THAT SOVIETS COULD ACCEPT EARLY RESOLUTION.

US ALSO SUGGESTED THAT SOVIETS SHOW GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON BASKET III AND CBM ISSUES IF THEY WANTED TO MOVE CONFERENCE ALONG. US TOLD SOVIETS THAT IT TOO WAS INTERESTED IN SEEING IF CONFERENCE ISSUES COULD BE MOVED ALONG; HOWEVER, US DID NOT COMMIT ITSELF IN MOSCOW TO ANY DATE OR ON ANY LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION FOR THE CONCLUSION OF STATE III. US REPS THOUGHT THAT PERHAPS BY THE END OF THE YEAR OR EARLY NEXT YEAR, ALLIES SHOULD TAKE STOCK OF SITUATION AND DECIDE HOW WE WANT TO SEE THE CONFERENCE END.

IT HAD BEEN AGREED BEFORE THE MOSCOW VISIT THAT BREZHNEV AND PRESIDENT FORD WOULD MEET, BUT THE US RESERVED ON PUBLICLY ISSUING FINAL WORD IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF SUCH A MEETING WAS WARRANTED. THE RESULTS OF THE MOSCOW MEETING WERE POSITIVE AND LED TO THE JOINT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT. US REPS SAW SOVIETS AS ACCEPTING PRESIDENT FORD'S COMMITMENT TO PURSUING THE POLICY LINES ESTABLISHED OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS. SOVIETS, HOWEVER, EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN ON THE PRESIDENT'S ABILITY TO FOLLOW THROUGH BECAUSE OF CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES.

US REPS DESCRIBED CONFERENCE ON THE WHOLE AS SATISFACTORY. IT RESULTED IN USEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. ALTHOUGH SOVIET RECEPTION WAS LESS FORMAL THAN IN PAST, IT WAS CORDIAL AND WARM AND CONSISTENT WITH TREATMENT GIVEN US SIDE AT PAST MOSCOW MEETINGS. BREZHNEV WAS DEEPLY INVOLVED IN TALKS, PERSONALLY SPENDING ABOUT TWENTY (20) HOURS IN THE VARIOUS MEETINGS.

ALLIES APPRECIATED TIMELINESS AND DEPTH OF EXCELLENT US PRESENTATION. THEIR QUESTIONS WERE WIDE-RANGING AND COVERED THE MIDDLE EAST; FBS; SALT; CSCE; MBFR; CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE; SOVIET STRATEGIC THINKING; SOVIET POLITICAL TACTICS, OBJECTIVES AND PERCEPTIONS; SOVIET LEADERSHIP; AND THE UPCOMING

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 244185

VLADIVOSTOK SUMIT MEETING. END SUMMARY.

1. ACTING SYG PANSA CHAIRED OCTOBER 29 NAC SESSION SCHEDULED TO HEAR A REPORT ON THE SECRETARY'S TRIP TO MOSCOW FROM COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT SONNENFELDT AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN. PANSA OPENED THE MEETING BY WELCOMING SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN "WITH GREAT PLEASURE" ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL. PANSA ADDED THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE TWO SENIOR US OFFICIALS WAS PROOF OF THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND SECRETARY KISSINGER PERSONALLY, ATTACH TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BOTH THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE OTTAWA DECLARATION. PANSA SAID HE WAS CERTAIN THAT ALL DELEGATIONS WERE LOOKING FORWARD TO A FIRST HAND ACCOUNT OF THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND SPECIFICALLY TO THE OUTCOME OF DISCUSSIONS ON SALT, UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING, EAST/WEST ISSUES SUCH AS SCSCE AND MBFR, AND

BILATERAL US/SOVIET RELATIONS. PANSA EXPLAINED THAT SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN WOULD TAKE QUESTIONS DURING THE COURSE OF THE MEETING, THUS PERMITTING A BROAD-RANGING EXAMINATION OF ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE ALLIES. PANSA THEN TURNED THE MEETING OVER TO THE US DELEGATION.

2. CHARGE (MCAULIFFE) POINTED OUT THAT THE COUNCIL WAS MEETING IN RESTRICTED SESSION AND THAT VERY SENSITIVE MATTERS WOULD BE UNDER DISCUSSION. HE ASKED, THEREFORE, THAT ALL DELEGATIONS TREAT THESE DISCUSSIONS AND THEIR CONTENTS WITH UTMOST CAUTION. PANSA ALSO URGED THE COUNCIL TO TREAT THE CONSULATIONS AS SENSITIVE.

3. SONNENFELDT THANKED PANSA FOR HIS WORDS OF WELCOME, AND SAID THAT HE AND HARTMAN WERE DELIGHTED TO BE BACK IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL. HE NOTED THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER WOULD HAVE LIKED TO COME TO THE COUNCIL, BUT WAS NOW SEVERAL THOUSAND MILES AWAY ON OTHER BUSINESS OF WHICH THE PERMREPS WERE AWARE. THE SECRETARY, HOWEVER, WISHED TO CONVEY HIS REGARDS AND HIS REGRET AT NOT BEING ABLE TO BE PRESENT. HE IS LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING WITH HIS MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES IN DECEMBER.

4. SONNENFELDT, SPEAKING FOR HIMSELF AND FOR HARTMAN, SAID HE WAS VERY PLEASED THAT SINCE THEIR LAST VISIT TO THE COUNCIL, AMBASSADOR DE ROSE HAS BEEN GIVEN A DISTINGUISHED HONOR BY THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE. IN EXTENDING HIS CONGRATULATIONS, SONNENFELDT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 244185

NOTED THAT ALL OF THE ALLIES HAD BENEFITTED FROM DE ROSE'S WISDOM ON MANY OCCASIONS.

5. SONNENFELDT OPENED HIS SUBSTANTIVE PRESENTATION BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD SPEAK BRIEFLY ON THE MOSCOW TALKS AND THEN TAKE QUESTIONS IN ORDER TO BETTER ELICIT PARTICULAR ALLIANCE INTERESTS AND VIEWS.

6. SONNENFELDT SAID THE UNITED STATES JUDGED THE OUTCOME OF THE MOSCOW TALKS TO BE SATISFACTORY ON THE WHOLE. HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS SECRETARY KISSINGER'S EIGHTH TRIP TO MOSCOW EITHER AS ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS OR AS SECRETARY OF STATE. THESE INCLUDED TWO SUMMIT TRIPS SINCE THE SPRING OF 1972. BECAUSE OF THE CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF SUCH TRIPS THE ROUTINE AND PROCEDURE FOR THEM HAVE BECOME WELL DEVELOPED, AND THE SOVIETS NOW SEEM MORE RELAXED AND INFORMAL IN THEIR MANNER AND CONDUCT. SOME JOURNALISTS HAD CONSIDERED THE AIRPORT RECEPTION FOR THE SECRETARY SOMEWHAT COOLER THAN ON PAST OCCASIONS. THE US DELEGATION, ON THE OTHER HAND, BELIEVED THIS IMPRESSION CAME SOLELY FROM THE FACT THAT THE RECEPTION WAS LESS FORMAL AND FELT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD SHOWN THE SAME WARMTH AS ON PREVIOUS VISITS.

7. SOVIET PRESS COVERAGE HAD BEEN AT THE SAME LEVELS AS IN THE PAST: PRAVDA HAD RUN FRONT PAGE ARTICLES DAILY, THE US/SOVIET TALKS WERE COVERED ON EVENING TV, AND TOASTS EXCHANGED WERE RENDERED ACCURATELY, ALTHOUGH PARAPHRASED. THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE APPEARED IN THE PRESS WITH A PHOTOGRAPH OF SECRETARY KISSINGER. SOVIET READERS WILL CERTAINLY NOTICE THAT GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV WAS PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN THE MEETINGS. INDEED, APPROXIMATELY TWENTY HOURS OF MEETINGS INVOLVING BREZHNEV WERE HELD. ALSO INVOLVED ON THE SOVIET SIDE WERE: FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO; BREZHNEV'S ASSISTANT, ALEXANDROV; SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON DOBRYNIN; AND KORNIYENKO, DIRECTOR OF THE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT IN THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY. AMBASSADOR STOESSEL, COUNSELOR SONNENFELDT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN AND VARIOUS US EXPERTS PARTICIPATED WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER ON THE US SIDE. ONE MEETING WAS HELD WITH ONLY BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO AND SECRETARY KISSINGER AND COUNSELOR SONNENFELDT PRESENT; WHILE IN ANOTHER BREZHNEV AND THE SECRETARY MET ALONE. ALL OTHER MEETINGS WERE HELD IN THE LARGER GROUP DESCRIBED ABOVE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 244185

8. SONNENFELDT EXPLAINED THAT THE US VIEWED THE MEETING PRIMARILY AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS. IT WAS THUS THE PRINCIPAL US PURPOSE TO SEE IF THERE WERE SIGNS OF FRESH SOVIET THOUGHT OR NEW FLEXIBILITY IN THIS AREA. IT HAD BEEN AGREED BEFORE THE MOSCOW VISIT THAT BREZHNEV AND PRESIDENT FORD WOULD MEET, BUT THE US RESERVED ON ISSUING FINAL WORD TO THE PUBLIC IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF SUCH A MEETING WERE WARRANTED. AFTER TWO DAYS IN MOSCOW, THE US DECIDED THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE WORTHWHILE AND THEREFORE AN APPROPRIATE PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT WAS RELEASED.

9. THE SOVIETS DID NOT OPEN MEETING WITH A DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, ALTHOUGH AT OUTSET THEY SAID THEY WERE INTERESTED IN THIS MATTER. RATHER, THE SOVIETS FIRST SEEMED TO WANT TO DISPEL DOUBTS THAT NEW US ADMINISTRATION MIGHT INTEND A CHANGE OF COURSE IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS. BREZHNEV THUS OPENED THE FIRST MEETING WITH A RECITATION OF SOVIET GRIEVANCES AGAINST THE US. SONNENFELDT ALSO THOUGHT THIS APPROACH MIGHT REFLECT A WELL-KNOWN SOVIET PRACTICE OF ATTEMPTING TO PLACE NEGOTIATING PARTNERS AT A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISADVANTAGE. ON THE OTHER HAND, GIVEN RIGHT DEGREE OF BREZHNEV'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO US/SOVIET RELATIONS, IT IS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE THAT HE MIGHT WANT REASSURANCES ABOUT US INTENTIONS.

10. SONNENFELDT SAID US HAD ANTICIPATED SOVIET COMPLAINTS. THESE FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON THE AREAS OF TRADE AND EMIGRATION. ON TRADE MATTERS, THE SOVIETS COMPLAINED THAT THEY HAD NOT YET RECEIVED THE MFN TREATMENT THEY HAD BEEN PROMISED BECAUSE THE

JACKSON AMENDMENT HAD BLOCKED PASSAGE OF THE TRADE BILL. BREZHNEV THUS ACCUSED THE US OF NOT MEETING ITS COMMITMENT IN THIS REGARD. THE SOVIETS WERE ALSO UNHAPPY ABOUT RECENT EXPORT-IMPORT BANK CREDIT LIMITATIONS AFFECTING THE SOVIET UNION. THE US HAD POINTED OUT TO BREZHNEV THAT MANY COMPLAINTS IN THIS LATTER AREA HAD BEEN CORRECTED.

11. ANOTHER MAJOR SOVIET COMPLAINT CONCERNED PUBLIC HANDLING IN US OF KISSINGER-JACKSON EXCHANGE OF LETTERS ON TRADE AND EMIGRATION. SONNENFELDT POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS ISSUE OF ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIETS, AND US ADMINISTRATION HAD CONSEQUENTLY DEPLORED PUBLICITY GIVEN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 244185

BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND SENATOR JACKSON. THE COUNSELOR POINTED OUT THAT ADMINISTRATION HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO NEGOTIATE WITH SENATOR JACKSON TO GET TRADE BILL PASSED, AND HAD EXPECTED SOME PUBLIC COVERAGE OF THE AGREEMENT WORKED OUT BETWEEN SECRETARY KISSINGER AND THE SENATOR. SONNENFELDT REPEATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD DEPLORED AMOUNT AND DEGREE OF PUBLIC "FANFARE" GIVEN THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS SINCE IT KNEW SUCH PUBLICITY WOULD HIT A SENSITIVE NERVE IN MOSCOW. WITH REGARD TO TRADE BILL, SONNENFELDT SAID THE ADMINISTRATION WAS CONFIDENT THAT IT WOULD PASS SOON AFTER THE CONGRESS RECONVENES. THE BILL IS NOW IN SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE AND WILL GO TO A CONFERENCE COMMITTEE SHORTLY AFTER THE CONGRESSIONAL RECES.

12. AS TO SOVIET PERFORMANCE UNDER THE AGREEMENT WORKED OUT BY THE SECRETARY AND SENATOR JACKSON, SONNENFELDT NOTED THAT AN 18-MONTH TRIAL PERIOD EXISTS IN WHICH PERFORMANCE COULD BE TESTED BEFORE MFN TREATMENT FOR THE SOVIETS MUST BE RENEWED. THE US HOPED, THEREFORE, THAT THE NUMBER OF EMIGRANTS FROM THE USSR WOULD INCREASE DURING THIS EIGHTEEN MONTH PERIOD SO THAT THE ADMINISTRATION COULD ASK CONGRESS FOR MFN RENEWAL AUTHORITY. IN THIS WAY, AND TRADE/EMIGRATION ISSUE WILL BE REDUCED AS A TROUBLE SPOT IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS.

13. BREZHNEV ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT THE US HANDLING OF MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS. THESE COMPLAINTS WERE LARGELY ON TRADITIONAL GROUNDS WITH ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE US FOR ACTING UNILATERALLY IN ITS APPROACH TO A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. BREZHNEV ALSO PRESSED FOR RESUMPTION OF GENEVA CONFERENCE.

14. THE COUNSELOR SAID BREZHNEV HAD ALSO RAISED A SERIES OF LESS SIGNIFICANT ISSUES IN HIS CATALOGUE OF COMPLAINTS. ONE OF THESE CONCERNED US EXPORT LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASES. IN RESPONSE TO BREZHNEV'S RATHER IRRITATED PRESENTATION ON THIS SUBJECT, THE US SIDE HAD EXPLAINED US ACTIONS AS NECESSARY IN TERMS OF WORLD FOOD DEMAND. THE US HAD STRESSED THAT IF THE SOVIETS WANTED TO BUY IN THE US AGRICULTURAL MARKET, THEY

MUST TELL THE US GOVERNMENT IN ADVANCE OF THEIR INTENTIONS AND OPERATE ON GUIDANCE WHICH WASHINGTON HAS ESTABLISHED FOR FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL PURCHASES. SONNENFELDT OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD KNOW HOW TO OPERATE IN SUCH A MANNER GIVEN THEIR OWN STATE TRADING SYSTEM. THEY SEEM, HOWEVER, TO WANT TO SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 244185

TAKE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE OF THE US FREE MARKET SYSTEM. SIMILARLY, FOR THE US TO OPERATE IN ANYTHING LIKE A CONTROLLED MARKET IS UNUSUAL; BUT THE US HAS NO CHOICE GIVEN CURRENT WORLD FOOD PROBLEMS. SONNENFELDT EXPLAINED THAT A COMPROMISE ON THIS ISSUE HAD BEEN WORKED OUT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE US HOPED THAT MOSCOW HAD LEARNED THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE US WITH FULL DETAILS IN ADVANCE OF FUTURE FOOD PURCHASES.

15. BREZHNEV HAD ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT CSCE ALONG TRADITIONAL SOVIET LINES. HE SAID THAT PROGRESS WAS TOO SLOW AND THAT THE US WAS NOT TAKING A SUFFICIENTLY ACTIVE ROLE TO MOVE NEGOTIATIONS ALONG RAPIDLY. IN SUBSEQUENT, ONE-HOUR MEETING ON CSCE, THE US MADE THE POINT IN MOSCOW THAT IT BELIEVED THE REMAINING ISSUES ON BASKET I PRINCIPLES, I.E., THE INTER-DEPENDENCE OF PRINCIPLES, THEIR EQUAL VALIDITY, AND LANGUAGE COVERING PEACEFUL CHANGE OF FRONTIERS, WERE ALL MATTERS ON WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD ACCEPT EARLY RESOLUTION. SONNENFELDT SAID US ASSUMED THAT SOVIETS WOULD DISCUSS THE PEACEFUL CHANGE ISSUE WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, AND THEREFORE HAD NOT TAKEN A MORE ACTIVE INTEREST OR DETAILED POSITION ON THIS MATTER SINCE THE FRG IS PRIMARILY INVOLVED. THE US IS WILLING, HOWEVER, TO SUPPORT THE FRG POSITION ON THESE ISSUES AND CAN ACCEPT WHATEVER COMPROMISE IS WORKED OUT BETWEEN BONN AND MOSCOW.

16. THE US ALSO URGED GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON CSCE BASKET III ISSUES, BUT DID NOT ENTER INTO SPECIFICS. SIMILARLY, THE US URGED THE SOVIETS TO MOVE ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, BUT HAD NOT ENTERED INTO SPECIFIC DETAILS. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THESE CONVERSATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE IMPATIENT AND WANT TO CONCLUDE THE CSCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE US SUGGESTED TO THE SOVIETS THAT IT TOO WAS INTERESTED IN SEEING IF CONFERENCE ISSUES COULD BE MOVED ALONG; BUT THE US MADE ABSOLUTELY NO COMMITMENT TO THE SOVIETS ON THE DATE AND LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION IN CSCE STAGE III.

17. SONNENFELDT TOLD THE COUNCIL THAT THE US HOPED THAT, PERHAPS BY THE END OF 1974 OR EARLY 1975, THE ALLIES COULD TAKE STOCK ON HOW CSCE MIGHT BE CONCLUDED AND HOW IT RELATES TO OTHER ONGOING EAST/WEST NEGOTIATIONS LIKE MBFR AND SALT. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE ALLIES "GEAR THEIR MINDS" TO A REVIEW OF SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 244185

THE WHOLE ISSUE EARLY IN 1975 AFTER THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL.

18. SONNENFELDT SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO MAJOR DISCUSSION ON MBFR BECAUSE, AFTER TWO DAYS OF OTHER DISCUSSION, THE US WAS ANXIOUS TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS ON SALT.

19. CONVERSATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS HAD FEATURED MANY GENERAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS BY BREZHNEV WHO TALKED REPEATEDLY OF THE FUTILITY OF THE ARMS RACE AND OBSERVED THAT NO NUCLEAR WAR COULD OCCUR AS LONG AS RATIONAL MEN LED THE US AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS. BREZHNEV'S PRESENTATION FEATURED MANY ANALOGIES AND ANECDOTES BASED ON HIS EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR II. SONNENFELDT SAID THE GENERAL IMPRESSION AFTER DISCUSSING SALT IN MOSCOW WAS THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS SERIOUSLY LOOKING AT WAYS OF FINDING AN AGREEMENT IN 1975. THEY, AS WE, SEEM TO BE PROMPTED BY A REALIZATION THAT 1976 WILL SEE ATTENTION IN US FOCUSED ON DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION, WHILE 1977 MARKS THE END OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

20. SONNENFELDT SAID THAT FOR SOME REASON THE SOVIETS MADE LITTLE REFERENCE THIS TIME TO THE FBS ISSUE. THERE WAS SOME REFERENCE, BUT BY COMPARISON TO THE MARCH MEETING -- WHEN BREZHNEV WENT INTO IT IN REAL DETAIL -- THE DISCUSSION WAS ALMOST PERFUNCTORY THIS TIME. HOWEVER, THERE WAS MORE DISCUSSION THIS TIME ON THE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF THIRD COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THAT OF THE CHINESE (CHARACTERIZED BY COLORFUL SOVIET REMARKS). BREZHNEV TRIED TO LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET UNION MUST ASSUME THE THREE THIRD COUNTRIES WITH NUCLEAR CAPACITY TO BE HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION, WHILE THE US CAN ASSUME THAT THEY ARE NOT HOSTILE TO THE US; AND THEREFORE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS ENTITLED TO SOME COMPENSATION IN SALT WITH REGARD TO THOSE THREE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS.

21. SONNEFLEDT SAID THAT THE US HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF ACCEPTING EQUAL AGGREGATE NUMBERS IN CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. IF THIS IMPRESSION IS CONFIRMED, IT WOULD BE A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH. WE SHALL NEED MORE DISCUSSIONS, WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, AND IN VLADIVOSTOK, BEFORE WE CAN TELL HOW THE NUMBERS MIGHT WORK OUT. THE SOVIETS ALSO LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY ARE MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF HAVING EQUAL NUMBERS OF MIRV LAUNCHERS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 244185

HOWEVER, THEIR SS-18 GIVES US PARTICULAR PROBLEMS, AND THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO FOREGO ITS MIR-ING. THE LARGE DISPARITY IN THROW-WEIGHT CONTINUES TO

CONCERN US AND WE SHALL HAVE TO CONTINUE PRESSING THEM ON IT. SONNENFELDT ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS INDICATED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN ABOUT THE US B-1, AND ITS ARMAMENTS. THIS ALSO WILL BE IN OUR FOLLOW-ON DISCUSSION OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS.

22. SONNENFELDT SAID IN CONCLUSION THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT WE MAY BE ON THE THRESHOLD OF AGREEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF EQUAL AGGREGATES. IF THIS IMPRESSION IS CONFIRMED, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO BUILD ONTO IT SEVERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE SALT AGREEMENT, AND HAVE THE DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA TO TO WORK ON SPECIFIC TERMS.

23. SONNENFELDT SAID THAT WE CONSIDERED THE EXCHANGE IN MOSCOW TO BE USEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE. WE SEE THE SOVIETS AS ACCEPTING THAT PRESIDENT FORD IS PURSUING THE POLICY LINES ESTABLISHED OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS, AND THE SOVIETS SEEM INTERESTED IN PURSUING THESE POLICY LINES AS WELL. THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE SOME CONCERN ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S ABILITY TO FOLLOW THROUGH, IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEMS. HE SAID THAT THE US CONSIDERS THE MOSCOW MEETING TO HAVE LAID A SOUND BASIS FOR THE FIRST FORD-BREZHNEV MEETING.

24. PANSA ASKED IF SONNENFELDT HAD ANY INTERPRETATION OF THE SOVIETS' REDUCED EMPHASIS ON FBS. SONNENFELDT REPLIED THAT HE HESITATED TO STATE A FIRM CONCLUSION. IT MUST BE CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS THAT IF THERE IS TO BE AN AGREEMENT, THERE WILL BE NO US AGREEMENT TO REDUCTION OF FBS IN THIS CONTEXT. REGARDING THEIR OTHER APPROACH -- COMPENSATION IN CENTRAL SYSTEMS -- -- THEY KNOW THE US TO BE VERY RELUCTANT. PERHAPS THERE IS A MORE REALISTIC SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO GET AN AGREEMENT. PANSA OBSERVED THAT PERHAPS THE SOVIETS WANT SIGNAL THAT THEY PREFER TO DISCUSS FBS IN THE CONTEXT OF MBFR.

25. KRAPF (FRG) NOTED THAT SONNENFELDT HAD EXPRESSED THE HOPE FOR EARLY AGREEMENT ON EQUAL AGGREGATE NUMBERS IN CENTRAL SYSTEMS. DID THAT MEAN THAT THE US CONCENTRATED ON NUMBERS, OR DID THE US ALSO GO INTO THROW-WEIGHT? IN THE LATTER CASE, DID THE US SEE ANY HOPE THERE? SONNENFELDT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 11 STATE 244185

REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO BE EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO DEAL WITH THE THROW-WEIGHT ISSUE HEAD ON. THE PROBLEM WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH IF WE HAVE AN ARRANGEMENT TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF MIRV LAUNCHERS. WE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THE RELEVANT CALCULATION AND SEE THAT THE THROW-WEIGHT DISPARITY WAS ADJUSTED. IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE US TO DEVELOP HEAVIER ICBM MISSILES WITHIN THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, I.E., TO DEVELOP A MISSILE LARGER THAN MINUTEMAN III, BUT STILL ABLE TO FIT INTO ITS SILO. THIS WOULD ADJUST TO SOME DEGREE THE THROW-WEIGHT DISPARITY. ALSO, IF WE COULD LIMIT THE SS-18, WE COULD ACHIEVE

GREATER CORRESPONDENCE. BUT, AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED, THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT WILLING TO DEAL WITH THE THROW-WEIGHT ISSUE HEAD ON, AS THIS COULD INVOLVE REDESIGNING THEIR ENTIRE FORCE.

26. KRAPF ASKED IF HE COULD INTERPRET SONNENFELDT'S OPTIMISM REGARDING EQUAL NUMBERS AS AN INDICATION THAT THE US IS NOW STRIVING FOR AGREEMENT ON A LIMITED ISSUE RATHER THAN AGREEMENT ON THE WHOLE. SONNENFELDT REPLIED THAT THE US DOES WANT OTHER PROVISIONS, BUT THE PROBLEM OF EQUAL NUMBERS HAS ALWAYS BEEN DIFFICULT, AND WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF AN AGREEMENT.

27. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) OBSERVED THAT MOSCOW SEEMS TO THINK EARLY CONCLUSION OF CSCE IS POSSIBLE, WHILE IN GENEVA THE SOVIETS HAVE INCREASED THEIR RIGIDITY; HE WONDERED IF THERE WAS NOT A MISUNDERSTANDING SOMEWHERE. HE WAS ALSO STRUCK BY THE NEW SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT SOVIETS ASSUMED THAT THE THIRD COUNTRIES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION NEEDED PROTECTION IN SALT; HE OBSERVED THAT NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES HAVE NO PROTECTION CONCERNING THESE COUNTRIES, E.G. CHINA. FINALLY, HE ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY SOVIET ATTEMPT TO CLAIRIFY ITS POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

28. REGARDING DE STAERCKE'S QUESTION ON CSCE, SONNENFELDT NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS FOR SOME TIME HAVE TAKEN THE LINE THAT THE MAJOR QUESTIONS ARE ALREADY SETTLED. BREZHNEV IN PARTICULAR IS IMPATIENT. HE BELIEVES BASKET III IS UNIMPORTANT, AND BASKET I HAS ONLY TWO OUTSTANDING ISSUES, WHICH SHOULD BE SETTLED ON HIS TERMS. SO THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION FROM THE SOVIET VIEWPOINT. THE SOVIETS HAVE RECENTLY MADE SOME EFFORT IN GENEVA TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY, BUT THAT EFFORT IS INSUFFICIENT. HARTMAN ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN PUZZLED ALL ALONG WITH HOW TO

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 12 STATE 244185

DEAL PROCEDURALLY WITH BAKET III ISSUES. THEY ARE LOOKING FOR SOME METHOD. THE SOVIETS HAVE HEARD OF THE EFFORTS OF THE NEUTRALS IN THIS RESPECT. THE SOVIETS MAY NOW BE WONDERING IF THERE IS NOW A MOVEMENT TOWARD PUTTING SOMETHING TOGETHER THAT THEY CAN MORE EASILY DEAL WITH.

29. REGARDING DE STAERCKE'S OBSERVATION ON NON-NUCLEAR POWERS' LACK OF PROTECTION AGAINST NUCLEAR POWERS, SONNENFELDT SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE ANSWER IS. THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT GIVEN PARTICULAR THOUGHT TO THAT ISSUE ALTHOUGH THEY FEEL THAT DETENTE SOMEHOW MEANS NUCLEAR WAR GENERALLY IS LESS LIKELY. THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR SECURITY IN ASIA POSES A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIETS WHICH THEY HAVE NOT ADDRESSED IN TALKING TO US.

30. CONCERNING DE STAERCKE'S QUESTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST, SONNENFELDT SAID THERE WERE NOW CONCRETE SOVIET IDEAS. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO SAY NO SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT ISRAELI

WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THEY NOTE THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, AND THEY STATE THAT THEY DO NOT WANT ISRAEL DESTROYED, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT PROVIDED VIEWS ON HOW TO PROCEED, OTHER THAN THAT THEY RESENT NOT BEING PART OF THE DIPLOMATIC GAME, AND THAT THEY BELIEVE GENEVA IS THE BEST PLACE TO PROCEED, SONNENFELDT UNDERLINE THAT THERE ARE NO CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS FROM THE SOVIETS.

31. THE NETHERLANDS REP (HARTOGH) ASKED IF THE US TEAM HAD GAINED ANY IMPRESSIONS AS TO UNDERLYING MOTIVES IN THE SOVIET APPROACH TOWARD THE US, AND THE WEST IN GENERAL. TO THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR, SOVIETS ACQUIESCENCE IN LINKING OF THE MFN ISSUE WITH THE PROBLEM OF IMIGRATION SEEMED CURIOUS SINCE THE LATTER WAS A QUESTION OF INTERNAL POLICY. HE ASKED WHAT MIGHT BE THE REASONS FOR THE SOVIETS GIVING IN ON THIS POINT: DID THEY NEED MFN THAT BADLY FOR ECONOMIC REASONS? OR WAS THEIR DESIRE TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF DETENTE? AMBASSADOR HARTOGH NOTED THAT CERTAIN PUBLICATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE 1973 EDITION OF A HANDBOOK FOR MILITARY OFFICERS, WERE TAKING A HARD LINE "COLD WAR" POSITION ABOUT THE NEED FOR VIGILANCE. SONNENFELDT REPLIED THAT IF ONE LOOKS AT WHAT THE SOVIETS SAY PUBLICALLY, THEY APPEAR TO REGARD THE DECISIONS OF THE 24TH CPSU PARTY CONGRESS AS DETERMINING THEIR FOREIGN POLICY GUIDELINES FOR THE PRESENT AND FORESEEABLE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 13 STATE 244185

FUTURE. THESE GUIDELINES ENVISAGE A PERIOD OF GENERAL ACCOMMODATION WITH THE WEST, A SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS, NORMALIZATION OF TRADE AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES AND THE ASSUMPTION OF CONTINUING MUTUAL HOSTILITY WITH CHINA. SOVIET PARTY CONGRESSES HAVE MORE IMPORTANCE THAN WE IN THE WEST SOMETIME BELIEVE, FOR THEY REPRESENT A FORM OF HISTORICAL LANDMARK WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE SOVIETS. THE WEST, THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT MINIMIZE THE IMPORTANCE THE SOVIETS ASSIGN TO THE DECISIONS OF THE 24TH PARTY CONGRESS, AND IT APPEARS THAT BREZHNEV IS PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO THOSE DECISIONS. MOREOVER, BREZHNEV GIVES THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HOPES TO SEE HIMSELF RECORDED IN HISTORY AS THE LEADING SOVIET FIGURE IN A PERIOD OF PEACE DURING WHICH THE USSR REACHED A HIGHER PLATEAU OF ECONOMIC PROSPERITY. THE SOVIETS WILL NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE TRYING TO UNDERMINE NATO, WHILE PROMOTING AN ATMOSPHERE OF WESTERN EUPHORIA OVER DETENTE. WE CAN EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO CONTINUE CONSPIRING AGAINST WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND LATIN AMERICA; THEY WILL NOT SEE THIS ACTIVITY AS INCONSISTENT WITH A DETENTE POLICY ALTHOUGH DETENTE MAY IMPOSE CERTAIN CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES.

32. SPECIFICALLY ON THE JEWISH EMIGRATION ISSUE, SONNENFELDT CONTINUED, THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SOVIETS WERE READY TO TALK

WITH THE UNITED STATES ABOUT THIS PROBLEM SHOWS THEY APPRECIATE ITS POLITICAL IMPORTANCE IN THE US AND RECOGNIZE THEY HAVE TO GIVE SOME KIND OF POSITIVE INDICATION ON EMIGRATION IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THEIR OTHER AIMS. MUCH, OF COURSE, WILL DEPEND ON WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENS IN PRACTICE ON JEWISH EMIGRATION AND SONNENFELDT HOPED THAT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE IN THE WEST WOULD DAMPEN DOWN AND NOT BE TOO EXPLICIT. TOO MUCH DISCUSSION OF IT IN THE WEST COULD PRODUCE A SOVIET REACTION CONTRARY TO THE ONE WHICH THE WEST DESIRES.

33. SONNENFELDT SAID THAT IN HIS VISITS TO MOSCOW, HE CONTINUES TO BE STRUCK BY AN APPARENT FEELING OF INSECURITY ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS. ALL THE GRIEVANCES THE SOVIETS ADDRESSED TO THE US SIDE DURING THIS LAST ROUND OF TALKS INVOLVED SOME FORM OF ALLEGED US DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE USSR, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CANCELLED WHEAT SALE, THE MIDDLE EAST AND MFN. THROUGHOUT THE TALKS THERE WAS HEAVY SOVIET EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR THE US TO
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 14 STATE 244185

CERTIFY THAT IT CONSIDERED THE USSR AN EQUAL. THE WEST OBSERVES THE GROWTH OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER, SONNENFELDT CONTINUED, AND HAS THE IMAGE OF A USSR THRUSTING FOR DOMINANCE AND SUPERIORITY. PERHAPS SUCH A VIEW IS OBJECTIVELY CORRECT, BUT THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY SEE THEMSELVES AS CATCHING UP TO THE WEST AND THE WEST SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE CONSCIOUS OF THIS SOVIET FEELING OF INFERIORITY. SONNENFELDT CONCLUDED THAT PERHAPS SOVIET POLICIES SHOULD BE SEEN AS AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE A RECOGNITION OF THEIR EQUALITY AND, THROUGH THIS A FEELING OF SECURITY.

34. ITALIAN PERMREP (CATALANL) NOTED THAT THE LATEST MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE MADE NO MENTION OF A SPECIAL ROLE FOR THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IN REACHING A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT AND ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY SIGNIFICANCE IN THIS. SONNENFELDT REPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED IN MOSCOW THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT PRESS FOR A REFERENCE TO A SPECIAL ROLE FOR THE GENEVA CONFERENCE BEYOND WHAT THE COMMUNIQUE CONTAINED. THE USSR REALIZES THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER IS NOT PREPARED TO ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO INJECT THEMSELVES INTO THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN A NEGATIVE WAY WHICH WOULD OBSTRUCT US EFFORTS. THE SOVIETS AT VLADIVOSTOK MAY, HOWEVER, TRY TO EXERT MORE PRESSURE FOR AN EARLY RETURN TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE TABLE.

35. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAD RAISED A POSSIBLE CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE DURING THE MOSCOW TALKS, TO WHICH SONNENFELDT RESPONDED THAT THIS SUBJECT HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED.

36. CANADIAN PERMREP (MENZIES) NOTED THAT WHEN SECRETARY KISSINGER BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ON JULY 4, THE SECRETARY HAD SAID HE HAD GAINED SOME INSIGHTS INTO SOVIET STRATEGIC THINKING. THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER THE LATEST MOSCOW TALKS HAD

GENERATED ANY NEW SUCH INSIGHTS. AMBASSADOR MENZIES WENT ON TO ASK WHETHER SOVIET SALT NEGOTIATOR SEMENOV HAD BEEN IN MOSCOW FOR THE TALKS AND WHETHER ONE COULD EXPECT ANY FUTURE CONCEPTUAL BREAK-THROUGH TO TAKE PLACE AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL OUTSIDE THE GENEVA SALT TALKS, OR AT GENEVA. FINALLY, AMBASSADOR MENZIES ASKED WHETHER THE "MISSILE RATTLING" ENGAGED IN BY BOTH THE US AND USSR JUST PRIOR TO THE MOSCOW TALKS (E.G., THE US UNVEILING OF THE B-1 BOMBER AND THE LAUNCHING OF A MINUTEMAN MISSILE FROM AN AIRCRAFT; ON THE SOVIET SIDE, THE FIRING OF A SS-/A17 IN THE PACIFIC, AND PRESS REPORTS OF STEPPING UP BACKFIRE AIRCRAFT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 15 STATE 244185

PRODUCTION.

37. SONNENFELDT REPLIED THAT THE U.S. SIDE HAD NOT OBTAINED ANY NEW INSIGHTS INTO SOVIET STRATEGIC THINKING DURING THE LATEST MOSCOW TALKS. THE ONE EXCEPTION TO THIS WAS SOVIET REFERENCES TO THE NEED TO PROTECT THE USSR AGAINST NUCLEAR THREATS FROM

THIRD COUNTRIES; THE SOVIETS SEEMED PREOCCUPIED BY THE POSSIBLE EMERGENCE OF A CHINESE SUBMARINE LAUNCHED MISSILE PROGRAM. SONNENFELDT ADDED THAT THE U.S. HAS AT PRESENT NO EVIDENCE OF URGENT CHINESE EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION, BUT ONE MUST ASSUME THAT THE CHINESE WILL IN TIME DEVELOP SUCH A CAPABILITY TO HIT SOVIET CITIES. SONNENFELDT NOTED THAT SOVIET SALT NEGOTIATOR SEMENOV HAD NOT BEEN PRESENT FOR THE MOSCOW TALKS, AND HAD NEVER PARTICIPATED IN ANY OF THE U.S.-SOVIET MEETINGS IN MOSCOW, AND THE SOVIETS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THEY HOPED THE U.S. SALT NEGOTIATOR WOULD NOT COME TO MOSCOW BECAUSE THEY WOULD THEN FEEL OBLIGED TO HAVE THEIR SALT NEGOTIATOR ATTEND. ON AMBASSADOR MENZIES' QUESTION ABOUT WHERE A CONCEPTUAL BREAKTHROUGH MIGHT TAKE PLACE, SONNENFELDT SAID HE SUSPECTED THAT THIS WOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE HIGHEST POLITICAL LEVEL. HE COMMENTED THAT DURING THE MOSCOW TALKS AMB. DOBRYNIN WAS SOVIET EXPERT ON STRATEGIC QUESTIONS, AND HE APPEARED TO BE PERSONALLY CLOSE TO BREZHNEV, WHO CALLS HIM BY HIS FIRST NAME. SONNENFELDT ADDED THAT HE EXPECTED THE BASIC DECISIONS ON SALT WOULD BE TAKEN AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL AND THAT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS WOULD DEAL WITH THE SPECIFICS OF THE PRINCIPLES DECIDED UPON. IN REPLY TO AMB. MENZIES' QUESTION ON "MISSILE RATTLING," SONNENFELDT SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO REFERENCE TO IT DURING THE MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS, AND THE UNVEILING OF THE B-1 AND THE FIRING OF THE MINUTEMAN FROM AN AIRCRAFT REVEALED NO SPECIAL INTENT ON THE U.S. SIDE AS REGARDS SALT. THESE EVENTS WERE PART OF PRE-ARRANGED SCHEDULE PREPARED FOR IN ADVANCE OF MOSCOW. THE SOVIETS AT MOSCOW, HOWEVER, HAD PROFESSED TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE B-1 AND THE TRIDENT, CLAIMING THAT THEY REPRESENT NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS. SOMEWHAT INCONSISTENTLY THE SOVIETS REFERRED TO ANALOGOUS DEVELOPMENTS ON THEIR SIDE AS "MODERNIZATION."

38 THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR (MENZIES) ASKED WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE LESSONS FOR THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE U.S. EXPERIENCE OF LINKING THE TRADE AND EMIGRATION ISSUES. PERHAPS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 16 STATE 244185

THE WEST MIGHT SEEK TO LINK BASKETS II AND III BY GIVING BASKET II INTERIM APPLICATION, SAY 18 MONTHS, SO AS TO SEE HOW THE RUSSIANS PERFORM ON BASKET III.

39. SONNENFELDT SAID HE WAS INTERESTED IN AMBASSADOR MENZIES' THEORY ABOUT TIEING BASKET II TO BASKET III. ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE LINKING OF SOVIET EMIGRATION POLICY TO U.S. TRADE POLICY WAS A UNIQUE SITUATION. THE WEST MUST AVOID BECOMING "SUPER-MARXIST" IN ITS APPROACH TO TRADE POLICY. MOREOVER, IT IS UNREALISTIC TO THINK THAT WE ARE GOING TO CHANGE THE SOVIET SYSTEM OR BRING ABOUT SIGNIFICANT MODIFICATION IN SOVIET SOCIETY BY USING TRADE CONCESSIONS AS LEVERAGE. SONNENFELDT ADMITTED SOVIET DESIRE FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY WAS STRONG, BUT ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRICE THEY ARE PREPARED TO PAY FOR IT HAS LIMITS. HE SAID HIS PERSONAL OPINION WAS THAT LINKING BASKET II WITH BASKET III WOULD ONLY PROVIDE SOVIET SENSITIVITIES. HE ASKED HARTMAN TO COMMENT.

40. HARTMAN SAID THAT SOVIET DESIRE TO DEAL ON THE EMIGRATION ISSUE WAS INFLUENCED BY THEIR DESIRE TO MOVE AHEAD ON OTHER ISSUES. IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECALL THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WAS OPPOSED TO THIS LINKAGE BUT THE MATTER WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S HANDS. HARTMAN DID NOT THINK IT WAS A GOOD IDEA TO INVOKE LINKAGE IN THE CSCE CONTEXT.

41. AMBASSADOR DE ROSE (FRANCE) FIRST WISHED TO INQUIRE WHETHER MESSRS. SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN HAD HEARD THAT LAST WEEK THE EC-9 POLITICAL COUNSELORS AGREED TO THE "AMERICAN" CSCE POSITION ON PEACEFUL CHANGE OF FRONTIERS. THEY, TURNING TO SALT, DE ROSE SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE TWO COMMENTS OF A GENERAL NATURE AND THEN TO POSE TWO QUESTIONS.

42. ASSUMING THE SOVIETS DO DROP WHAT HE CALLED THEIR RATHER EXTRAVAGANT POSITION ON FBS, DE ROSE SAID, THAT WOULD BE AN ENORMOUSLY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT. IT WOULD SIGNAL THAT SOVIET LEADERS HAVE MADE JUDGEMENT THAT NUCLEAR WAR WOULD BE ABSURD AND THAT THE RIDICULOUS QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ARMS RACE MUST BE ENDED BY REACHING SOME RATIONAL POSITION ON EQUIVALENCE. THIS WOULD INDEED BE A SENSATIONAL DEVELOPMENT--A DEVELOPMENT FOR WHICH THE U.S. WOULD DESERVE TO CONGRATULATE ITSELF AND INDEED ALL THE ALLIES COULD CONGRATULATE THEM--
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 17 STATE 244185

SELVES FOR HOLDING TO
THEIR POSITION. UNIQUE AS SUCH AN ACHIEVEMENT MIGHT BE, DE ROSE
WARNED, IT NEED NOT IN HIS OPINION BE ACCOMPANIED BY SOVIET
REASONABLENESS IN OTHER FIELDS--IN MORE "NORMAL" FIELDS--OF
EAST/WEST INTERCOURSE.

43. DE ROSE SAID HE HAD JUST READ WITH INTEREST A REPORT ON THE
RECENT WARSAW CONFERENCE ON PREPARATIONS FOR A CONFERENCE OF
EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES. THIS REPORT CONCLUDED THAT THE CPSU
IS CURRENTLY SUBJECT TO SIGNIFICANT PRESSURES FROM OTHER COMMUNIST
PARTIES TO PUT AN END TO THE POLICY OF DETENTE OR
TO SIGNIFICANTLY MODIFY IT. ACCORDING TO DE ROSE'S SOURCE, OTHER
EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES ARE TELLING THE SOVIET
UNION THAT THE MASSES ARE BECOMING WORRIED ABOUT IDEOLOGICAL PURITY
AND ABOUT WHAT THEY REGARD AS MISSED OPPORTUNITIES TO CAPITALIZE ON
THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES IN THE CAPITALIST WORLD. IN SUM, DE
ROSE SAID, A 1975 SALT AGREEMENT, IF IT COMES, WILL NOT IN HIS
OPINION BE ACCOMPANIED BY A RELAXING OF SOVIET PRESSURE IN OTHER
FIELDS.

44. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID HIS SECOND POINT WAS THAT IF THE
SOVIETS DROP THEIR EXORBITANT POSITION ON FBS HE IS NOT CONVINCED
THAT THIS WILL MEAN MODIFICATION OF THEIR EXTRAORDINARY
POSITION ON THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR POWERS; THE
U.K., FRANCE AND CHINA. HE SAID THE SOVIETS DEFINITION OF WHAT IS
A STRATEGIC AS OPPOSED TO A TACTICAL WEAPON IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR
POSITION ON THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR POWERS DOES NOT STAND UP TO STUDY.

45. TURNING TO HIS TWO QUESTIONS, HE REFERRED TO THE ENTRY OF
HEAVY BOMBERS INTO THE GENERAL AGGRAGATE. DE ROSE SAID WHEN
AMBASSADOR JOHNSON BRIEFED THE NAC RECENTLY HE DEMONSTRATED HOW
HEAVY BOMBERS COULD BE DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER
WEAPONS SYSTEM, PARTICULARLY BY THE MASSIVE LOADS THEY CAN
CARRY. HE WISHED TO ASK SONNENFELDT HOW THIS PROBLEM WOULD BE
DEALT WITH. DE ROSE'S SECOND QUESTION REFERRED TO THE U.S. POSITION
OF SEEKING NOT ONLY CURTAILMENT OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS BUT ALSO THEIR
REDUCTIONS. HE WISHED TO KNOW IF THE SOVIETS WERE READY TO DEAL
WITH THE QUESTION OF REDUCTIONS.

46. SONNENFELDT WISHED FIRST TO ADDRESS DE ROSE'S QUESTIONS,
THEN HIS EARLIER REMARKS. ON THE ISSUE OF BOMBERS AND HOW THEY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 18 STATE 244185

WILL BE COUNTED, SONNENFELDT SAID THE QUESTION OF ARMAMENT OF THE
BOMBERS CONCERNED THE SOVIETS GREATLY. THE U.S.
WILL SIMPLY HAVE TO WAIT TO SEE HOW THEY WILL SEEK TO ALLOW FOR THE
FACT THAT, ON THE ONE HAND, THESE NEW BOMBERS CAN SIMPLY CARRY
A NUMBER OF BOMBS. BUT ON THE OTHER, THEY CAN CARRY FROM

10 TO 30 AIR-TO-GROUND MISSILES, EACH OF WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS A SEPARATE LAUNCHER. HE PREDICTED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY COME UP WITH SOME FORMULA SPECIFYING THAT EACH HEAVY BOMBER WOULD COUNT AGAINST THE U.S. AS THE EQUIVALENT OF 10 TO 30 LAUNCHERS. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT WITH, FOR EXAMPLE, 200 B-1 BOMBERS, EACH OF WHICH COULD BE CONFIGURED FOR AIR-TO-GROUND MISSILES, YOU COULD EAT UP THE ENTIRE AGGREGATE. IN SHORT, SONNENFELDT SAID, THE QUESTION REMAINS. THE SOVIETS ARE CONCERNED, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT APPROACH THEY WILL TAKE.

47. REGARDING DE ROSE'S SECOND QUESTION, SONNENFELDT SAID SECRETARY KISSINGER FOUND THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS WITHIN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE. ONE MIGHT SAY THE SOVIETS FAVOR "FREEDOM TO MIX." HOWEVER, THEY DO TALK ABOUT SOME CARRY-OVER OF THE NUMBERS ESTABLISHED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, INCLUDING NUMBERS OF NEW SILOS. THIS SUGGESTS SOME FORM OF SUB-CEILING APPLYING TO CERTAIN WEAPONS SYSTEMS. HOWEVER, THE MATTER WILL HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED FURTHER.

48. SONNENFELDT CONTINUED SAYING THERE WAS SOME TALKS ON ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS FROM THE HYPOTHETICAL HIGH NUMBER THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED IF THERE WERE NO AGREEMENT BUT RATHER AN UNLIMITED ARMS RACE, OR WHETHER THEY ARE REALLY READY TO SPEAK OF REDUCTIONS FROM THE ACTUAL ARMS PROGRAMS NOW UNDER WAY. THIS SUBJECT REQUIRES FURTHER DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIETS.

49. TURNING TO DE ROSE'S EARLIER OBSERVATIONS, SONNENFELDT SAID HE KNEW THAT THE EC NOW SUPPORTS THE SO-CALLED "AMERICAN FORMULA" ON PEACEFUL CHANGE OF FRONTIERS. HE REMARKED THAT HE AND HARTMAN BRIDLE A BIT ABOUT IT BEING CALLED THE AMERICAN FORMULA BECAUSE IT WAS REALLY ADVANCED BY THE UNITED STATES ON BEHALF OF THE ALLIES. BE THAT AS IT MAY, WHILE WE ALWAYS WELCOME THE SUPPORT OF THE NINE, IN THIS CASE HE FEARED IT WOULD NOT AMOUNT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 19 STATE 244185

TO MUCH BECAUSE IN HIS OPINION THIS "AMERICAN FORMULA" WOULD NOT HAVE "A SNOWBALL'S CHANCE" OF BEING ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIETS. SONNENFELDT SAID THAT THE SOVIETS READ THIS LANGUAGE AS NOTHING SHORT OF AN INVITATION TO CHANGE FRONTIERS.

50. SONNENFELDT AGREED WITH DE ROSE'S OBSERVATION THAT IF WE HAVE A SALT AGREEMENT IN 1975 IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY SIGNAL MOVEMENT IN STUBBORN SOVIET POSITIONS ELSEWHERE. THE U.S. IS ALSO KEENLY AWARE OF THE REVISED ROLE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES. HOWEVER, WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT A SALT AGREEMENT CANNOT SURVIVE IN AN OTHERWISE HOSTILE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST, AND WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT

INCLUDES AN OTHERWISE HOSTILE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND COUNTRIES ALLIED TO THE UNITED STATES. IN OUR VIEW A SALT AGREEMENT WILL HAVE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT IN THE EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP OVER A WIDE AREA. AS ADVOCATES OF THE ORIGINAL LINKAGE DOCTRINE IN 1969 AND 1970 WE CANNOT THINK OF SALT AND OF IMPROVED POLITICAL RELATIONS IN ISOLATION. SO, IN DETERMINING WHAT WILL BE ITS POLICY IN WHAT DE ROSE CALLED "NORMAL" AREAS, THE SOVIET UNION WILL HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THIS U.S. ATTITUDE ON THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR ANY SALT AGREEMENT TO SURVIVE.

51. CONCERNING DE ROSE'S POINT ON THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR POWERS, SONNENFELDT SUGGESTED THAT "FRANCE'S VERY RATIONAL PRESIDENT" TAKE UP THIS MATTER WITH MR. BREZHNEV WHEN THE LATTER VISITS PARIS. WHILE THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UK IS MORE A MATTER OF EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION, SONNENFELDT SAID, THEIR CONCERN ABOUT CHINA IS MUCH MORE GENUINE, EVEN IF IT IS IRRATIONAL. SONNENFELDT CONCLUDED BY REPEATING HIS INVITATION TO THE FRENCH TO MAKE CLEAR TO MR. BREZHNEV THEIR POSITION ON THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR POWERS.

52. THE UK AMBASSADOR (PECK) SAID ALL OF HIS PREPARED QUESTIONS HAD BEEN ANSWERED IN PREVIOUS RESPONSES. HE JOINED IN EXTENDING THANKS FOR U.S. EFFORTS IN ARRANGING THESE CONSULTATIONS AND ESPECIALLY FOR THE FRANK MANNER THE U.S. VISITORS HAD DEALT WITH DIFFICULT QUESTIONS.

53 AMBASSADOR SVART (DENMARK) OBSERVED THAT PATIENCE HAD BROUGHT ITS OWN REWARD AS HIS QUESTIONS ALSO HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY ANSWERED.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 20 STATE 244185

HE WISHED TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY, HOWEVER, TO JOIN IN EMPHASIZING SONNENFELDT'S POINT ABOUT THE SOVIET INFERIORITY COMPLEX. SONNENFELDT REPLIED THAT HE TAKES NO COMFORT IN THIS ANALYSIS AND CAUTIONED THAT IT DOES NOT LEAD TO CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET BEHAVIOUR.

54. THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR (ERALP) HAD TWO QUESTIONS, NEITHER DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH THE MOSCOW DISCUSSION, FIRST HE INQUIRED ABOUT THE POSITION OF MR. BREZHNEV WHO ALWAYS SEEMS TO BE THE AMERICAN INTERLOCUTOR, ERALP WANTED TO KNOW IF WE FIND THAT HE HAS CONSOLIDATED HIS POSITION AS "THE" SOVIET LEADER, SECOND, CONCERNING THE VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT, ERALP ASKED WOULD ANY DOCUMENT OR AGREEMENT BE SIGNED THERE?

55. SONNENFELDT REPLIED THAT THE POSITION OF MR. BREZHNEV SEEMS TO US TO BE STRENGTHENED AND CONSOLIDATED. IN OUR VIEW THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT HE IS THE SENIOR MAN IN A COALITION OF INTERESTS AND WE EXPECT THAT POSITION WILL CONTINUE. THIS IS PROBABLY THE RESULT OF THE FACT THAT HE IS SO SKILLFUL AT

OBSERVING THE REQUIREMENTS OF COLLEGIALLY.

56. SONNENFELDT SAID THAT OTHER EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT HE, UNLIKE HIS PREDECESSOR KHRUSHCHEV (ABOUT WHOM BREZHNEV TALKED IN UNFLATTERING TERMS), HAS THIS SENSITIVITY ABOUT COLLEGIALLY. BREZHNEV LEADS A COALITION IN WHICH THERE ARE SHIFTING FORCES. THROUGH IT IS A COALITION WHICH HAS NOT OUTSIDE OPPONENTS, SOMETIMES HE HAS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO FORCES WITHIN THE COALITION. THESE ARE SEEN BY US AS ACTIONS NOT ALWAYS HARMONIOUS WITH GENERAL POLICY TRENDS.

57. CONCERNING THE VLADIVOSTOK MEETING, THIS HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY AND EXPLICITLY DESIGNATED AS A "WORKING MEETING" AND SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH THE MORE SOLEMN AND ELABORATE PREVIOUS SUMMITS. SONNENFELDT SAID THAT WHILE HE COULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE COULD BE SOME AGREEMENT READY FOR SIGNATURE, AT THE MOMENT NONE IS FORSEEN.

58. PANSAL REMARKED THAT ALL QUESTIONS THUS FAR HAD BEEN IN REGARD TO THE MOSCOW VISIT AND ASKED IF MEMBER WISHED TO ASK ABOUT OTHER SUBJECTS. DE STAERCKE ASKED HOW THE WEATHER WAS IN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 21 STATE 244185

VLADIVOSTOK IN THE WINTER.

59. SONNENFELDT SAID IS SIMILAR TO VANCOUVER. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN INSISTENT ON SPECIFYING THAT THE MEETINGS WOULD BE IN THE "VICINITY OF VLADIVOSTOK" SO WE ASSUME THEY MAY BE PREPARING SOME SORT OF POTEMKIN VILLAGE FOR US.

60 SONNENFELDT ASKED TO MAKE ONE FURTHER POINT. THE US WOULD VALUE HAVING ANY VIEWS FROM THOSE WHOSE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OR PRIME MINISTERS MIGHT SOON SEE THE SOVIETS. HE FEELS IT IMPORTANT -- FOR THE SAKE OF ALL ALLIED GOVERNMENTS -- TO SEE HOW OUR IMPRESSIONS MESH ON THESE MEETINGS. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT TIME IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MOSCOW'S POLICIES. THEREFORE, WE PARTICULARLY HOPE TO GET A READOUT ON THE FORTHCOMING MEETINGS IN MOSCOW AND PARIS.

61. PANSAL THANKED SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN NOT ONLY FOR THEIR PRESENCE BUT ALSO FOR THE FRANK AND THOROUGH MANNER IN WHICH THEY RESPONDED TO ALL QUESTIONS SOME OF WHICH WERE NOT EASY. HE ASKED THEM TO CONVEY TO SECRETARY KISSINGER NOT ONLY THE COUNCIL'S SENSE OF SATISFACTION BUT ALSO SOME OF THE VALUABLE IDEAS WHICH VARIOUS ALLIES PUT FORTH. PANSAL ALSO WISHED SECRETARY KISSINGER GOOD LUCK ON HIS VERY IMPORTANT NEXT TRIP.

62. TURNING TO PRESS GUIDANCE, PANSA SUGGESTED THAT, IF QUERIED,
THE NATO SPOKESMAN SHOULD SAY THE NAC TODAY HELD
CONSULTATIONS WITH TWO HIGH US OFFICIALS -- CONSELOR SONNENFELDT
AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN -- ON THE SUBJECT OF US SECRETARY
OF STATE KISSINGER'S LATEST MEETING WITH SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY
BREZHNEV. MCAULIFFE

UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 NOV 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE244185
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EUR:JDROUSE
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740322-0296
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741165/aaaacdoq.tel
Line Count: 987
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 18
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <28 MAR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <23 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECRETARY KISSINGER'S MOSCOW VISIT: REPORT TO NAC, OCT 29
TAGS: PFOR, PARM, UR, NATO, NAC, (KISSINGER, HENRY A), (SONNENFELDT), (HARTMAN)
To: BELGRADE MULTIPLE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005